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Abstract
We revisit Wagner’s law of increasing state expenditure by function of government
expenditure. Using data of 14 European countries between 1996 and 2013, we apply
panel data and SUR methods to assess public expenditure-income elasticities. We
find that some functions of government spending for a few countries (e.g. Austria,
France, the Netherlands, and Portugal) validate Wagner’s law. For the Netherlands
expenditures with environment protection increase more than proportionately to eco-
nomic growth, and for France that is the case of spending in housing and community
amenities. In addition, Greece is the only country where two public spending items
react more than one to one to growth.
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The role of the state in the economy has been a recurring debated subject, between
politicians and the academic community. The different perspective – more liberal or more
interventionist – about the government effect on macroeconomic dynamics has led to the
analysis of government spending effects on economic activity. More liberal viewpoints
claim for a lesser interventionist role of the state in economics. On the other hand, a more
active behaviour, by the government on economic activity might induce better economic
performance, through policies aiming at economic stabilization, leading and improving the
welfare of all society.
The German economist Adolph Wagner in 1883 highlighted patterns in the relationship
between the increase of public expenditures and economic growth, his so-called “Law of
increasing state activity”. According to Peacock and Scott (2000), this law refers to an ab-
solute and relative increase of the government within the economy, namely an expansion on
providing defence, administrative, law, and education and welfare services, among others.
Another view of how government should react to economic growth is the Fiscal Stimulus
Hypothesis, where the government can implement counter-cyclical policies to reduce the
impact of the business cycle. Finally, the Budget Stickiness Hypothesis argues that public
spending should not change since public expenditure policies are targeted in a long-run
perspective. Therefore, those policies could become too rigid to face short-run economic
fluctuations.
We assess government expenditures’ response to an increasing economic activity, namely
to verify an empirical validation of Wagner’s law by dissecting the expenditures by function
of government, via the Classification of Functions of the Government (COFOG) nomen-
clature.
Our results show that, when we analyse the various function of government expenditure,
there are some evidences of Wagner’s law. Specifically, and analysing the behaviour of
public expenditures of individual countries of our sample, we find that some countries such
as Austria, France and Portugal highlight some patterns which suggest the validation of
the law.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Section Two provides the literature
review. Section Three presents the methodology, the data and sources. Section Four
provides the empirical analysis. The last section presents the conclusions.
2
2. Literature
Regarding earlier the articles studying Wagner’s law, we can for instance mention Ram
(1987) who used data for 115 countries for the period 1950-1980, and find no support
for the law. Bairam (1995) finds that only government spending not-related with defence
supports the verification of the law for the United States.
Wahab (2004) splits the government expenditure-economic activity relationship be-
tween periods with strong and weak economic growth, i.e., above, or at, and below eco-
nomic growth trend, respectively. The author finds that there is an only limited evidence of
Wagner’s law validation. Akitoby et al. (2006) determine a long-term relationship between
economic activity and public expenditure, using data for 51 developing countries for a time
span of 32 years. Kolluri and Wahab (2007) formulate a new empirical methodology to
test Wagner’s law. The authors mention that government spending reacts more actively
in economic slowdowns and report evidence supporting Wagner’s law for OECD countries
but not for EU countries.
Shelton (2007) disaggregates the various rubrics of public spending and argues that the
empirical validations depend upon the preferences of fiscal policies set by the governments.
On the other hand, Durevall and Henrekson (2011) study the ratchet effect hypotheses for
Sweden and United Kingdom since the XIX century until 2006. They find no long-run
evidence empiricism of Wagner’s result, despite some evidence of public expenditures and
growth relationship in some particular periods.
Magazzino (2011) studies the connection between spending and growth, controlling for
money supply, for the Italian case during 20 years at a disaggregated level, and he finds
that economic affairs and education favours the German economist perspective. For a 23
OECD country sample, between 1970 and 2006, Lamartina and Zaghini (2011) conclude
that the poorer the country is, measured by the initial per capita GDP, and the higher
is the elasticity between public expenditures and economic growth. This analysis made
for the years between 1970 and 2006 give support to Wagner’s law validation. Brückner
et al. (2012) use panel data techniques and argue for support of Wagner’s phenomenon
only when considering the upper bound for long-run estimations of income elasticity of
government spending.
Kumar et al. (2012) study the issue for New Zealand, between 1960 and 2007, and
reach the conclusion that the law is verified. Afonso and Jalles (2014) study the causal
relation between spending and growth for 155 countries over 30 years. The authors’ con-
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clusions support the idea of a GDP per capita causality on government expenditures and,
furthermore, the existence of Wagner’s law concept.
Kuckuck (201) studies the validity of the law for Italy, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and
United Kingdom, concluding that the stronger is the evidence of Wagner’s phenomenon,
the lower is the development stage of each country. Lastly, Fedeli (2015) assesses the
linkage between regional per capita health care expenditures and per capita GDP for the
Italian case between 1982 and 2009, via panel cointegration, reporting evidence for the
validity of Wagner’s law.
3. Methodology and Data
3.1. Methodology
We assess Wagner’s law using two approaches. First, we will apply a panel data method-
ology to compute the relevant coefficient regarding the law. In this framework, we use three
data sets: 1) Full sample; 2) periods in which a country’s economic growth rate is at or
above its economic growth rate trend; 3) periods with an economic growth rate below its
trend. In the second approach, we apply a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estima-
tion, distinguishing each function of government expenditure-economic growth elasticity
for every country in our sample. In the SUR approach, we do not split between above and
below economic growth time trend.
Therefore, our regression for each function of government expenditure (GOVEXP) and
for both approaches, for country i (i = 1, ..., N) at time t (t = 1, ..., T ), is represented in
the following form:
∆GOV EXPi,t = γ + β∆RGDPi,t + ηi + ϕt + εi,t, (1)
where ηi, ϕt are the country-specific and time effects, respectively, and varepsiloni,t is
the independent errors across countries. For Wagner’s law of expanding state expenditure
validation we may obtain a statistical significance of an elastic symmetric relationship
between government expenditure and economic growth. As Kolluri and Wahab (2007)
demonstrate, this would imply in our case that ∆GOV EXP ≥ ∆RGDP . In other words,
the estimated regression coefficient associated to real GDP must be greater or equal than
one (β ≥ 1).
For the first approach, we estimate (1) with 2SLS in order to control for possible
4
endogeneity problems. Additionally, and in order to assume a residual heteroscedasticity,
we also use the White diagonal covariance matrix.
3.2. Data
The model is estimated for the period between 1996 and 2013 for 14 European countries:
Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE),
Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES),
Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK).
Our data was retrieved from International Monetary Fund sources. For the data regard-
ing the evolution of economic activity, we use the annual growth rate of gross domestic
product at constant prices (RGDPGR) from World Economic Outlook. From the Gov-
ernment Financial Statistics, we use the annual growth rate of the following statistics of
expenditures by function of government in percentage of GDP: culture, recreation and
religion (CUL); defence (DEF); economic affairs (ECO); education (EDU); environment
protection (ENV); health (HEA); housing and community amenities (HOU); public or-
der (PUBOR); expenditures on general public services (PUBSER); and social protection
(SOCPRO)1. We present in Table 1 the respective summary statistics.
1The ten United Nations COFOG categories are as follows: 01 – General public services; 02 – Defence;
03 – Public order and safety; 04 – Economic affairs; 05 – Environmental protection; 06 – Housing and
community amenities; 07 – Health; 08 – Recreation, culture and religion; 09 – Education; 10 – Social
protection.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the panel - 1996-2013 (annual growth rates)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
RGDPGR 1.87 2.85 -8.86 GR (2011) 11.18 IE (1997) 252
CUL 1.42 10.64 -44.44 SE (2000) 50.00 DE (1997) 251
DEF -1.35 8.24 -35.00 NL (2011) 34.78 DE (1999) 251
ECO 1.74 26.44 -70.16 GR (2011) 268.57 GR (2010) 251
EDU 0.32 4.61 -10.96 NL (2012) 37.93 DE (2003) 251
ENV 1.27 12.25 -69.23 AT (1997) 50.00 SE (2001) 251
HEA 1.49 4.52 -10.94 DE (2012) 25.86 IT (2006) 251
HOU 0.66 36.90 -94.83 IT (1996) 500.00 IE (2003) 251
PUBOR 1.08 6.92 -12.50 DK (2011) 71.43 DE (2011) 251
PUBSER -1.16 6.23 -22.95 GR (1999) 23.33 DE (2006) 251
SOCPRO 0.65 4.50 -23.68 GR (2000) 22.46 GR (2009) 251
Source: IMF, WEO, GFS, and own calculations.
4. Empirical Analysis
The results displayed in Table 2 show the absence of evidence of Wagner’s law. In
fact, the few statistical significant coefficients of public expenditures obtained for some
government spending functions support the existence of counter-cyclicality.
Nevertheless, in the SUR estimation we find some evidence of the law of increasing
state activity for some countries and functions of government expenditures. In fact, for the
expenditures regarding culture, recreation and religion, Portugal shows a statistical signifi-
cant coefficient, and greater than one. With respect to defense, Austria shows an elasticity
consistent with the German economist’s proposition. On the other hand, Netherlands
seems to increase more than proportionately the expenditures with environment protec-
tion, whilst for France spending in housing and community amenities increase more than
the GDP growth rate. In addition, Greece is the only country with two public spending-
economic performance elasticities greater than one.
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Table 2: Panel coefficients estimates for Wagner’s law, 1996-2013, 2SLS
Full Sample
CUL DEF ECO EDU ENV HEA HOU PUBOR PUBSER SOCPRO
Explanatory Variable: RGDPGR
0.603 -0.325 0.285 0.001 -0.916 -0.378 -2.331 -0.033 -1.165*** -0.434**
(0.436) (0.425) (2.066) (0.170) (0.817) (0.279) (2.374) (0.254) (0.300) (0.180)
Obs. 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238
R-squared 0.043 0.044 0.015 0.065 0.017 0.074 0.029 0.089 0.182 0.222
Above time trend
CUL DEF ECO EDU ENV HEA HOU PUBOR PUBSER SOCPRO
0.006 0.604 -4.690 0.055 1.491 0.573 -0.682 0.279 -1.640** -0.508
(1.229) (0.742) (7.257) (0.395) (1.321) (0.511) (5.565) (0.873) (0.670) (0.615)
Obs. 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119
R-Squared 0.161 0.023 0.262 0.086 0.044 0.008 0.068 0.077 0.197 0.520
Below time trend
CUL DEF ECO EDU ENV HEA HOU PUBOR PUBSER SOCPRO
1.097 -0.110 -0.353 -0.776 -2.010 -0.321 -0.900 -0.982 0.130 0.136
(2.979) (1.483) (4.012) (1.030) (1.398) (0.822) (4.202) (0.765) (0.676) (0.492)
Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
R-squared 0.014 0.079 0.107 0.196 0.057 0.141 0.108 0.178 0.126 0.065
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The robust standard errors
are in brackets. The White diagonal covariance matrix is used in order to assume residual heteroscedasticity.
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Table 3: SUR estimation of Wagner law, 1996-2013.
Countries CUL DEF ECO EDU ENV HEA HOU PUBOR PUBSER SOCPRO
Austria 0.146 2.727*** -2.441 -0.990*** -0.173 -0.271 -4.107*** -0.033 -1.352*** -1.129***
(0.527) (0.599) (2.704) (0.160) (1.908) (0.239) (1.577) (0.373) (0.357) (0.122)
Belgium -0.238 -0.030 -1.961 -1.348*** -2.697* -1.518*** 2.886 -1.118*** -1.321*** -1.632***
(0.961) (0.591) (2.705) (0.161) (1.440) (0.344) (2.388) (0.295) (0.310) (0.134)
Denmark -1.649** -1.885*** -2.164*** -1.373*** -2.186*** -1.489*** -3.405*** -2.132*** -1.213*** -2.039***
(0.647) (0.598) (0.739) (0.155) (0.634) (0.203) (1.279) (0.442) (0.408) (0.242)
Finland -0.338 -0.550 -1.072*** -0.368*** -0.382 -0.369*** -0.878** -0.571*** 0.030 -0.465***
(0.352) (0.279) (0.254) (0.068) (0.415) (0.075) (0.367) (0.129) (0.168) (0.056)
France -1.626*** -2.435*** -3.608 -1.426*** -4.601*** -1.626*** 2.551** -1.810*** -0.086 -1.329***
(0.503) (0.791) (6.154) (0.187) (1.027) (0.318) (0.982) (0.255) (0.363) (0.245)
Germany 1.451 -0.716 -2.246 -2.452*** 0.524 0.317 -3.589** -2.026** 1.158 0.007
(1.774) (1.148) (3.964) (0.730) (0.930) (0.478) (1.615) (0.988) (0.726) (0.328)
Greece 0.371* -0.604 -1.868 0.092 1.294*** 0.330** 2.808*** 0.216 -1.763*** -0.202
(0.195) (0.379) (3.617) (0.170) (0.299) (0.165) (0.399) (0.145) (0.267) (0.335)
Ireland -0.462 -0.702*** -0.746 0.039 -0.144 -0.041 -2.560 -0.333*** -0.575*** -0.393***
(0.639) (0.204) (1.059) (0.097) (0.274) (0.077) (3.880) (0.101) (0.181) (0.042)
Italy 0.178 -0.806 -1.578 -0.831*** 0.022 -0.347 -3.904 -0.090 -0.493** -1.453***
(0.276) (0.512) (1.203) (0.134) (0.441) (0.627) (2.841) (0.337) (0.249) (0.117)
Netherlands 0.579 0.128 0.263 -0.226 2.484*** -0.578* 0.011 -0.911*** -2.999*** -1.272***
(0.449) (1.116) (1.251) (0.286) (0.639) (0.312) (0.943) (0.315) (0.577) (0.114)
Portugal 1.589*** 0.036 -1.299 -0.291** -0.410 -0.497*** 0.917 0.028 -1.893*** -1.227***
(0.371) (0.352) (1.607) (0.134) (0.639) (0.165) (0.935) (0.265) (0.340) (0.178)
Spain 0.030 -0.245 -1.567*** -1.246*** -0.895 -0.495** -1.239 -0.480* -1.357*** -0.943***
(0.418) (0.331) (0.434) (0.241) (0.616) (0.200) (1.207) (0.258) (0.431) (0.096)
Sweden -0.889** -0.572* -1.210* -0.770*** -2.223** -1.045*** -2.203*** -1.078*** 0.025 -0.886***
(0.424) (0.298) (0.631) (0.158) (1.061) (0.083) (0.525) (0.261) (0.341) (0.133)
United Kingdom 1.276 -0.656* -1.260 -0.195 1.272 -0.762*** -0.598 -0.094 -0.267 -1.306***
(1.045) (0.370) (3.621) (0.380) (1.397) (0.219) (1.130) (0.458) (0.606) (0.143)
Notes: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The robust standard errors
are in brackets. The White diagonal covariance matrix is used in order to assume residual heteroscedasticity.
5. Conclusions
We assessed Wagner’s proposition throughout functions of government spending for 14
EU countries in the period 1996-2013. Applying panel data and SUR estimation techniques
we have found some evidence of Wagner’s result.
Looking in detail to the public spending-economic growth elasticities, some functions
of government spending for a few countries (e.g. Austria, France, the Netherlands, and
Portugal) do validate Wagner’s law. For instance, for the Netherlands expenditures with
environment protection increase more than proportionately to economic growth, and for
France that is the case of spending in housing and community amenities. In addition,
Greece is the only country where two public spending items react more than one to one to
growth.
Therefore, and even is some cases there is counter-cyclicality in several government
spending items in the full panel sample, the existence of higher than unity elasticities
vis-à-vis economic growth hints at the Wagner’s regularity.
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